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Abstract
Political candidates raise campaign funds from a variety of sources. Whether contributions
from certain sources should be restricted has been the subject of debate in the U.S. since
the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. I contribute to this debate by showing that the
source of contributions aects the policy choice of candidates. When lobby contributions
are limited, and candidates need to choose between costly fundraising activities or self-
nancing of the campaign, two types of candidates emerge: \rich" candidates with non-
partisan positions and \poor" candidates choosing policies along party lines. An implication
of the model is that restricting self-nance causes policy platforms to diverge under certain
conditions. For instance, the Millionaires' Amendment in McCain-Feingold, which raised
limits on contributions for candidates whose opponent is relying heavily on personal funds,
could increase political polarization in the United States.
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1 Introduction
Elections are expensive. According to the Campaign Finance Institute, more than $389
million was spent for the U.S. Senate elections in 2008, with the average expenditure of a
candidate being $5.9 million. Another $808 million of campaign expenditure is recorded for
the U.S. House elections the same year, with an average candidate spending $1.07 million.1
Where does this money come from? There are basically four sources of campaign nance
in federal elections in the U.S.: individuals, political action committees (PACs), political
parties, and personal funds of candidates. Table 1 summarizes the percentage contribution
of each source in the U.S. congressional elections in 2008.
Table 1: Campaign Funding Sources for House and Senate Candidates, 2008
Percentage of Contributions
House Senate
Incumbents Challengers Open Seats Incumbents Challengers Open Seats
Individuals 50 66 55 57 70 72
PACs 45 14 23 25 7 18
Parties 0 2 2 2 3 2
Candidates 0 16 19 1 6 2
Other 4 2 2 13 13 8
Source: Federal Election Commission.
According to Table 1, the biggest portion of contributions comes from individuals, fol-
lowed by contributions by PACs. Incumbents do not spend a lot of their own money, whereas
challengers and those that run in open-seat elections contribute up to 19% in the U.S. House
elections. These numbers are similar in earlier elections.
There is an extensive literature on PAC contributions, explaining why PACs would want
to contribute to campaigns. According to Morton and Cameron (1992), which is a critical
survey of the earlier literature, there are two types of models explaining why PACs would
want to contribute to political campaigns. One assumes PACs support candidates who are
expected to return quid pro quo favors if elected. The other type of model assumes PACs
contribute to the campaigns of politicians they favor, so as to help them win the election.
More recent models assume that interest groups value informational lobbying of elected
politicians and contribute to a candidate's campaign in order to gain access to him if he is
elected (examples of such models include Austen-Smith (1998) and Cotton (2009)).
These three motives have dierent implications on the behavior of contributors and the
1See Ornstein et al. (2008).
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policy decisions of politicians. While models assuming explicit favors produce divergence of
policy positions by opposing candidates, Austen-Smith (1987) shows such a result does not
hold if PACs are assumed to donate to increase the election chances of their favorite candi-
date. Later, Baron (1994) generalizes Austen-Smith (1987)'s results, illustrating that diver-
gence may be an equilibrium outcome for particularistic policies beneting certain groups
while the cost being widely distributed among other groups, and convergence may be an equi-
librium outcome for collective policies whose benet and cost are distributed across larger
groups. In a recent paper, Livshits and Wright (2009) argue that divergence could also be a
result of collective policies if free-riding of lobbies is taken into account.
Despite accounting for most of campaign nance, not much research is done to understand
individual contributions. One exception is the book by Francia et al. (2003) documenting
who nances U.S. congressional campaigns, what their motives are, and fundraising tech-
niques politicians use to attract contributions. In a recent paper, Ensley (2009) investigates
whether contributions from individuals are related to the policy position of a candidate. He
concludes that while the ideological standing of a candidate matters for fundraising, the rel-
ative ideological distance between candidates is not related to the amount of contributions
raised from individuals. So, for example, the more conservative a Republican candidate, the
more money she raises from individuals, and how liberal her Democratic opponent is does
not matter for her fundraising success. I use this result to motivate an assumption I make
in the model.
Research on self-nance is not common either. However, a detailed empirical analysis of
self-nanced congressional candidates can be found in Steen (2006). One of the questions the
author is interested in answering is how self-nancing aects competitiveness in elections.
Her conclusion is that self-nancing is not as productive in converting dollars into votes as
fundraising. Yet, it reduces the quality of opponents a self-nancer faces, thereby giving the
wealthy candidate an advantage in elections.
While empirical research on individual contributions and self-nance provides us with
important stylized facts, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no theoretical work that
puts together these dierent sources of contributions. A complete model of campaign con-
tributions and policy choices of candidates would require a general equilibrium analysis of
demand and supply.2 Demand for campaign contributions would depend on a number of
parameters including policy preferences of candidates, policy positions of their opponents,
cost of fundraising activities, and other variables. Supply of campaign contributions, on the
other hand, would depend on the number and policy stance of PACs and partisan individual
donors; candidates' personal wealth and access to loans; legal, institutional, and economic
2See Silberman and Yochum (1980) for a similar remark.
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limits to contributions; and other variables. In equilibrium, demand and supply would need
to be equal for each candidate's campaign. The probability of election for each candidate,
as well as their policy choice would be determined according to the dynamics of the market
for campaign contributions.
In this paper, I propose a model that would constitute a rst step towards building such
a comprehensive model of campaign contributions. I consider a two-candidate election with
two types of voters: partisan and independent. Candidates need to persuade independent
voters in order to win the election and need to raise funds to run a campaign targeted at
these voters. There are three possible sources of contributions: partisan individuals, PACs,
and candidates themselves.3 Candidates decide how much to rely on each source. Raising
funds from PACs is costless for the candidates. I show that PAC contributions are sucient
in equilibrium as long as there are PACs that hold more extreme policy positions than
the candidates and there are no limits on how much they PACs can contribute. In this
case, candidates do not engage in any costly fundraising activities or contribute to their
own campaigns. Moreover, there are no incentives for candidates to converge or diverge
their policies in equilibrium. However, if there are limits on PAC contributions, then the
candidates need to consider other sources of funds and adjust their policy choices accordingly.
Without self-nancing, if the median partisan voters are closer to the two extremes, then
candidates would diverge; and if the median partisan voters are moderate, candidates would
converge. However, these convergence/divergence tendencies need not be realized if there are
wealthy candidates, who would self-nance their campaigns rather than rely on fundraising.
Candidates, whose policy stance is not aligned with the preferences of partisan voters can
use their personal funds as a tool to sustain their own policy choices. This implies that when
we expect policy convergence (divergence) in equilibrium when there is no self-nancing, we
could observe divergent (convergent) policies once we allow candidates to spend their own
money.
One of the contributions of this paper is to demonstrate that convergence or divergence of
policies in equilibrium depends on the sources of contributions and limits on these sources.
The mechanism for convergence and divergence I oer in this paper is distinct from the
explanations provided by other authors, such as Livshits and Wright (2009) and Alesina and
Holden (2008). For example, Alesina and Holden (2008) argue candidates may resort to
ambiguity in their campaigns, so as to guarantee contributions from extremist contributors
while attracting the votes of moderates. According to my model, candidates can still be
3I ignore party contributions candidates receive. These contributions are quite small (see Table 1), and
explaining why parties support some candidates more than others would require an analysis of party inner
workings, which I do not focus on in this paper.
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clear about their policy preferences in public and support their position with their personal
wealth rather than rely on outside funding.
The model provides a framework in which the eects of changes in campaign nance
regulations on candidates' policy choices can be evaluated. Political polarization has been an
increasing concern for many politicians and citizens, and the polarization index by McCarty
et al. (2006) shows that polarization in the U.S. has been increasing since the 1970s. I argue
in this paper that campaign nance laws might have to do with that increase.
In what follows, I rst lay down the basics of the model and dene a political equilibrium.
I solve for the equilibrium rst in the benchmark case when there are no limits on PAC
contributions and then show how the equilibrium changes after a cap on lobby contributions
is introduced.
2 Model
Consider a one-dimensional issue a society will decide on through a two-candidate elec-
tion. The issue space is a compact subset of positive real numbers. There are two types
of citizens: partisans and independents. Partisan citizens are distributed across the issue
space, each with single-peaked preferences with an ideal policy point. Those with an ideal
point to the left of the middle point of the issue space belong to Party A, and those to the
right of the middle point belong to Party B. In the election, each partisan voter casts her
vote for the party she supports.
Independent citizens do not have preferences over the issue; their vote depends on which
candidate persuades them. Candidates use campaign spending to persuade the independent
voters. The more a candidate spends on the campaign, the higher her chances of getting
elected. Candidates can raise campaign funds through three sources: contributions from
lobbies, contributions from partisan voter, and personal resources. Whoever receives the
majority of the votes wins.
There are a large number of lobbies, which are positioned uniformly on the issue space,
each with single-peaked preferences. They make contributions to candidates' campaign but
they do not vote. The amount of their contributions depend on how close a candidate's
announced policy is to their ideal policy. A partisan voter's contribution also depends on
the distance between the candidate's policy point and the voter's ideal policy.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Candidates announce their policy stance and how much they are willing to contribute
to their own campaign.
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2. Partisan voters and lobbies contribute to the candidate they support.
3. Election is held.
4. The policy of the elected is implemented.
2.1 Candidates
There are two candidates running in the election, one for each party. Party A's candidate
has an ideal policy A on the issue space, and Party B's ideal point is B. If candidate
i 2 fA;Bg is elected for oce in the general election, she would receive returns equal to
R  cii   f(ei)
where R is the returns from holding oce regardless of the policy implemented, which can
be thought of as ego rents associated with the position, cii is the contributions the candidate
makes to her own campaign, and f(ei) is the cost of exerting eort ei to attract partisan
voters' contributions, with f 0(ei); f 00(ei) > 0;8ei 2 [0; 1]. Let Pi be the probability of winning
the election. Then, any candidate solves the following problem in the rst stage of the game:
max
cii;ei
PiR  cii   f(ei) (1)
subject to
0  cii  yi
0  ei  1
Here yi represents the income or borrowing constraint of the candidate, and this constraint
is allowed to be dierent across candidates. Some candidates may have access to bigger
personal funds than others. This constraint would be binding for \poorer" candidates.
2.2 Voters
There are N voters, where N is a large but nite number. A fraction  of these voters
are partisan, with A belonging to Party A and B belonging to Party B, where A +
B = . Let x
P
A denote the ideal policy position of the median partisan voter supporting
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Party A. Each partisan voter contributes to Party A's campaign by the same amount,4
and following the empirical ndings of Ensley (2009) mentioned in the introduction, total
individual contributions are assumed to take the following form:
cPA = AN eA (	A   jxPA   Aj) (2)
where 	A is the maximum amount a partisan voter would contribute to A's campaign. Note
that the more eort, eA, the candidate exerts, and the closer her policy stance is to the
ideal point of the median partisan voter, the more contributions she raises from partisan
voters. The largest amount of total partisan contributions is AN	A, raised when eA = 1
and xPA = A.
The rest of the citizens are independent voters, and their vote depends on how much is
spent to convince them by each candidate. It is assumed that candidates engage in persua-
sive rather than informational campaigning. Independent voters have full information about
the policy stances of the candidates; however, they do not have a clear preference as in the
case of partisan voters. Hence, candidates need to persuade them of their quality and va-
lence characteristics. As explained by Mueller and Stratmann (1994), modeling campaigning
eorts as persuasive rather than informational ts better with rational motivations of PACs
and partisan voters to contribute.
The more candidates spend on their campaign, the higher the probability of persuading
independent voters. The probability of Party A's candidate being elected to oce, then,
would be:
PA = A + (1  ) CA
CA + CB
(3)
where CA = c
L
A + c
P
A + c
A
A is the total contributions made to A's campaign, and similarly for
CB. See below for total contributions by lobbies, c
L
A.
Note that this \vote production function" assumes the productivity of all contributions
to be the same, regardless of the source. One could argue that fundraising activities, and
hence contributions raised from individuals are better than self-nanced funds in producing
votes. Indeed, this view nds support from Steen (2006). Alexander (2005) reports that PAC
contributions in U.S. House elections are positively correlated with probability of winning,
whereas self-nancing is negatively correlated. Depken (1998) nds similar results for the
1996 U.S. congressional elections. One way to incorporate these ndings into equation (3) is
4Another way to model partisan voters' contributions is to let each voter contribute according to the dis-
tance between the candidate's policy and the voter's ideal point. However, this requires additional notation,
and complicates the model without providing a much better intuition.
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to assign an exogenous weight to each source of contributions. However, exogenous weights
dierent than 1 would not aect the implications of the model, and hence are ignored. Vote
production functions with endogenous weights are left to future research.
2.3 Lobbies
There are M lobbies5, where M is a large but nite number. Let xL` denote the ideal
policy of lobby `, and cL`;A and c
L
`;B denote the contributions made by this lobby to each
party's campaign. Lobby ` maximizes its expected benets from the election:
max
cL`;A;c
L
`;B
 PA jxL`   Aj   (1  PA) jxL`   Bj   cL`;A   cL`;B (4)
subject to
cL`;A; c
L
`;B  0
It is important to note that lobbies do not get any direct benets from the candidate(s) they
support. They realize their eect on the probability of election of each candidate through
their contributions. They make contributions to increase the chances that the candidate
closer to their ideal wins the election. Any deviation from their ideal policy causes a loss for
the lobbies, so they want the policy to be implemented after the election to be as close to
their ideal point as possible.
Total contributions made by lobby ` to A's campaign can then be found as:
cLA =
X
`
cL`;A (5)
3 Political Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept used is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which requires all
players to act rationally at every stage of the game given what has happened in previous
stages and what is expected to happen in the coming stages. Given ideal policy positions A
and B of candidates; x
P
A and x
P
B of partisan median voters; x
L
` , 8` of lobbies; partisan citizen
distributions , A, and B; number of lobbies, M , and number of voters, N , a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium consists of eort levels ei and personal campaign contributions c
i
i of
each candidate i, lobby contributions cL`;A and c
L
`;B by each lobby `, individual contributions
cPA and c
P
B by partisan voters, and probabilities of getting elected PA and PB, such that each
5Throughout the model, I will use the term \lobby" instead of \PAC" to keep the notation clear and
simple.
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candidate, lobby, and partisan voter acts optimally, i.e. solve their respective optimization
problems.
The equilibrium of this game is found by backwards induction, starting at the last stage
of the game: the election.
3.1 Election
Since there is no uncertainty in the model regarding who will be elected once all players
make their decisions, the equilibrium in the election stage would be determined by which
party has the partisan voter advantage. If A > 0:5, Party A would win. If A < 0:5, Party
B would win. The more interesting case is when A = 0:5, and the candidate who raises
the most money, and hence convinces most of the independent voters, would win. In this
case, both candidates would try to raise equal amounts of contributions so as to neutralize
the eect of the independent voters on the election outcome, and sustain the equilibrium
with 50% probability of winning for both candidates. It is assumed that a coin is tossed to
determine the winner in this case. In the remainder of the paper, I will assume A = 0:5.
3.2 Contributions
3.2.1 Lobby Contributions
Given partisan contributions cPi and self-nance of candidates c
i
i, each lobby solves the
maximization problem summarized by (4). Substituting (3) in (4), we get:
max
cL`;A;c
L
`;B
 (A+(1 ) CA
CA + CB
)jxL`  Aj (1 A (1 )
CA
CA + CB
)jxL`  Bj cL`;A cL`;B (6)
subject to
cL`;A; c
L
`;B  0
The solution to this problem renders the propositions below. Proofs of the propositions
can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 1 Each lobby contributes to at most one candidate's campaign.
This is to be expected, because each lobby would try to maximize the election probability of
the candidate positioned closer to their ideal point, and contributing to the other candidate's
campaign would decrease that probability.
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Proposition 2 If a lobby contributes to a campaign, it contributes to the one oering the
policy closest to its ideal position. If two candidates are at equal distance from a lobby,
neither receives a contribution from that lobby.
This is due to symmetric preferences lobbies have. They do not have any partisan tendencies,
and only care about the distance between their ideal point and the policies of the candidates.
Hence, contributing to either campaign when candidates are equally far away is wasteful.
Proposition 3 Let MA be the number of lobbies ` that contribute to A's campaign and MB
the number of lobbies `0 contributing to B's campaign. Then the aggregate contribution supply
functions can be obtained as:
CA =
" p
1 
MB
P
`0
pjxL`0   Aj   jxL`0   Bj
MA
MB
P
`0
p
jxL
`0 Aj jxL`0 B jP
`
p
jxL`  B j jxL`  Aj
2
+ 1
#2
(7)
CB =
" p
1 
MA
P
`
pjxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj
MB
MA
P
`
p
jxL`  B j jxL`  AjP
`0
p
jxL
`0 Aj jxL`0 B j
2
+ 1
#2
(8)
Proposition 4 If there are no restrictions on how much each lobby can contribute, then it
is only those lobbies that are more extreme than the candidates that end up contributing.
That is, lobbies positioned on either side of A and B make contributions, and the lobbies
in between the two candidates do not make any contributions. This proposition is due to
moderate lobbies free riding on the contributions of extremist lobbies. Extremist lobbies act
collectively, and each contributes the same amount. However, as with any collective action
problem, there is a tendency to free ride within the extremist lobbies. I do not address
the collective action problem, and assume the extremist lobbies solve this problem within
themselves. For an explicit treatment of free riding in a similar environment, see Livshits
and Wright (2009).
Proposition 5 Regardless of cPA, c
P
B, c
A
A, and c
B
B, total contributions in equilibrium are:
CA = CB = (1  )(B   A)
4
(9)
Consistent with what was expected at the general election stage of the game, lobbies work
so as to neutralize the eect of independent voters in the election. More importantly, lobbies
equalize total contributions regardless of what partisan voters and candidates themselves
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contribute. This makes these sources unimportant, and we would expect partisan contribu-
tions and self-nancing to be 0 in equilibrium when there is no limit on how much lobbies
can contribute.
Also note that total contributions depend on the fraction (1  ) of independent voters
in the society, and the policy dierence (B   A) of the two candidates. As the fraction
of independent voters increase, more contributions are needed to persuade these voters.
In addition, lobbies would be willing to contribute more when the policy positions of the
candidates are further away from one another. So, in communities where partisan voters
dominate and moderate candidates emerge, campaigns would be less costly.
3.2.2 Partisan Contributions
Given policy and eort selections of each candidate, partisan contributions can be found
by using equation (2), and the symmetric function for candidate B. Note that partisan voters
do not take into account how much lobbies or the candidates contribute to each campaign.
As long as a candidate exerts positive eort, they provide nancing to the campaign. As
argued above, candidates do not exert any eort when lobby contributions are unlimited.
Hence, in equilibrium eA = eB = 0 and c
P
A = c
P
B = 0.
3.2.3 Candidates' Own Contributions
Since any contributions by candidates decrease the amount contributed by lobbies, cAA =
cBB = 0 in equilibrium.
3.3 Candidate Emergence
While the decision whether to run in the election is not explicitly modeled, it is implicit
that a candidate would emerge if and only if she can support her ideal policy through raising
at least as much as her potential opponent. The ideal policies of candidates do not matter
in that the probability of election depends only on campaign contributions, as long as there
are equally many partisan voters supporting each party. Hence, according to the model, any
policy position can be sustained as part of an equilibrium, and candidates need not converge
towards or diverge from the median voter to win the election when lobby contributions
are unlimited. Any change in contributions when a more moderate or extremist candidate
emerges in one party is oset by an equal increase in the opponent's contributions, rendering
all policy positions equally likely to win the election. This result holds as long as there
are suciently many lobbies with more extremist policy preferences than the candidates
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running for oce. If there are not suciently many extremist lobbies, or if they are income-
constrained or in any other way limited in their contributions, candidate emergence would
be aected. This idea is explored more in detail in the rest of the paper.
4 Limits on Lobby Contributions
Suppose a cap cL is put into eect that limits how much each lobby can contribute to
a candidate's campaign, so that cL`;i  cL;8`; i 2 fA;Bg. This limit could be due to legal
changes in the campaign nance law or other changes, such as a decrease in earnings of
lobbying groups, that make it costly/less protable for lobbies to make large contributions
to political campaigns.
While total contributions are the same for the two candidates, per lobby contributions
depend on how extreme the candidates are. Because it is those lobbies that are more ex-
tremist than the candidates that provide funding, per lobby contributions increase as the
candidate becomes more extremist. Figure 1 shows how per lobby contributions change as
the policy choice of candidate A changes. The lobby contributions on the graph are calcu-
lated when the policy space is limited to [0; 10], lobbies are uniformly distributed along the
policy space, and the policy choice of candidate B is xed at B = 7. Note that the per
lobby contributions are equal when MA = MB, that is when the candidates are symmetri-
cally located around the median lobby (when A = 3, hence B   A = 4 in the gure). Per
lobby contributions for A increase exponentially once A becomes more extremist than B,
that is when A is further away from the median lobby than B. This is because the number
of lobbies MA that are more extreme than candidate A is decreasing.
This observation has important implications for extremist candidates. A limit on in-
dividual lobby contributions would aect extremist candidates more severely than it does
moderate candidates, provided that lobbies do not change their contributions. The following
proposition explains how lobbies behave when their an upper limit to their contributions is
introduced.
4.1 Lobby Contributions
Conjecture 1 If there is an upper bound to how much each lobby can contribute, then it is
only those lobbies for which the limit is binding that end up contributing.
According to this conjecture, when lobby contributions are limited, lobbies more mod-
erate than the candidates start contributing to campaigns. All contributing lobbies pay the
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Figure 1: Per Lobby Contributions as a Function of Policy Divergence.
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same amount, which is equal to the cap on contributions, cL. This result has important
implications for campaign contributions and political polarization.
One implication of this conjecture is as long as there are moderate lobbies willing to
contribute to political campaigns, caps on lobby contributions do not matter. Candidates
have no incentive to converge or diverge their policy positions, and they do not need to
exert eort to raise partisan contributions or spend their own money. However, if there are
not many moderate lobbies and the lobbies are concentrated at extreme positions instead, as
argued by McCarty et al. (2006) to be the case for the U.S., then limits on lobby contributions
cause candidates to look for alternative sources of campaign nance.
Consider the case when no alternative sources of contributions exist, and the candidates
have to rely on lobby contributions. In this case, putting a cap on contributions gives
an advantage to the party that has more moderate lobbies on its side than the opponent.
Suppose two candidates, A1 and B1, emerge for the two parties. Assume Party A has
many moderate lobbies that are closer to A1's policy than B1's, and Party B does not
have moderate lobbies close to its candidate's policy.6 Under such circumstances, a more
extreme candidate for Party A would beat B's candidate. With a more extreme candidate,
the policy dierence (B   A) increases, and with a binding cap on lobby contributions,
moderate lobbies start contributing. Since Party B does not have supporting moderate
6Even if moderate lobbies exist on Party B's side, they might lack resources compared to the lobbies
supporting Party A. In this case Party A still has advantage over B.
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lobbies, it would not be able to raise as much money as Party A, and therefore lose the
election. When Party B clearly has no chance of election, no lobby would contribute unless
the party's candidate could resort to partisan contributions or self-nancing.
4.2 Partisan Contributions and Self-Financing
Suppose that candidates are allowed to raise funds from partisan voters and contribute
to their own campaigns. Assume there are not suciently many moderate lobbies or the
existing ones are income-constrained. As argued above, whether lobbies contribute to a
campaign would depend on the policy of the candidate, other contributions she raises, and
the campaign contributions of her opponent. LetMi be the number of lobbies contributing to
candidate i's campaign. Then, Mi =Mi(i; c
P
i + c
i
i; Cj), i; j = 1; 2. Note that because lobby
contributions are costless, candidates would try to raise as much as they can from lobbies
before looking for other sources. Therefore, each candidate would adjust her fundraising
activities and self-nance so that all contributing lobbies pay the maximum amount cL.
Candidate i's optimization problem can then be written as:
max
i;cii;ei
(i +
Mi(i; c
P
i + c
i
i) c
L + cPi + c
i
i
Mi cL + cPi + c
i
i + C i
)R  cii   f(ei) (10)
subject to
cPi = iNei(	i   jxPi   ij)
0  cii  yi
0  ei  1
For a candidate, partisan voters' contributions and self contributions are perfect substi-
tutes in that any additional contribution increases the probability of election equally inde-
pendent of its source. However, the cost of raising partisan contributions may be dierent
than the cost of self-nancing for a candidate, and this dierence would aect the candidate's
choice over the source of contributions.
There are a number of variables that play important roles in a candidate's choice over
the source of contributions. One is the maximum individual contributions, 	i, candidate i
can raise when she exerts maximum eort and her policy stance matches her party's median
voter's ideal point. This limit can be interpreted as the legal cap on individual contributions,
or it could reect the income constraint of the partisan voters. If income is not symmetrically
distributed across the political spectrum, and one candidate has a richer constituency than
the other, that candidate would have a fundraising advantage over his opponent, and hence
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would not need to use his own funds as much. This is also true when the size of partisan
constituencies, A and B, are dierent. The candidate with a bigger support group can
rely more heavily on individual contributions.
The closer a candidate's policy stance is to the median partisan voter's ideal point, the
larger contributions that candidate can raise for any eort level. Assuming the median
partisan voter to have moderate policy preferences, moderate candidates would be at an ad-
vantage. Extremist candidates either need to exert more eort, e, to raise the same amount
as the moderate candidates, or they need to use personal funds to pay for campaign expen-
diture. Obviously, this decision depends on how costly fundraising is to the candidate. This
cost can be thought of as reecting quality dierences across candidates. A candidate can
be better in fundraising than the other, perhaps because he is a better public speaker, uti-
lizes technology and innovations in mass communication in a better way7, has more political
experience8, or is an incumbent9. Hence, the returns to fundraising eorts could dier from
one candidate to the other.
Finally, the decision over the source of campaign nancing also depends on the income or
borrowing constraints of a candidate. A rich candidate could donate or lend huge amounts of
money to her own campaign. Indeed, Steen (2006) nds that the average wealth of candidates
that contribute heavily to their own campaigns is three times that of candidates that do not
self-nance their campaigns.
I do not provide the explicit solution to this optimization problem since the solution is
intuitive. A candidate would raise funds through either of these methods if the marginal
utility, which is the additional probability of election, of the contribution exceeds its marginal
cost. At an interior solution, where fundraising eorts and personal contributions are both
positive, marginal utility is equated to marginal cost for both sources. When the upper limit
of a source is binding, marginal utility of contributions from that source is greater than the
marginal cost.
4.3 Candidate Emergence
When lobby contributions are limited, whether a citizen emerges as a candidate in the
election depends on if his income constraint is binding, and how costly fundraising is for
7Popular media claims Howard Dean's 2004 campaign and Barack Obama's 2008 campaign have rev-
olutionized the way candidates organize their supporters and communicate with their constituents. Many
articles attribute Obama's successful campaign to the internet. See several relevant articles in the New York
Times, The Hungton Post, and Time magazine, among others.
8According to Steen (2006), there is a strong negative relationship between political experience and
self-nancing for the U.S. congressional candidates.
9See Francia et al. (2003) for a discussion on incumbency advantages to fundraising in the U.S. congres-
sional elections.
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him. A \poor" candidate, whose income constraint is binding, would need to raise funds
from partisan individuals, and therefore need to appeal to the median partisan voter. This
means that a poor candidate cannot choose a policy position too far away from the partisan
ideal. On the other hand, a rich candidate can sustain her non-partisan policy choice through
self-nancing her campaign. So, a rich candidate has more freedom in choosing her policy
stance.
Steen (2006) nds that wealthy candidates deter high-quality opponents from entering
the political race. This observation is consistent with the implications of the model. When
faced with a wealthy candidate, a high-quality opponent (whose marginal cost of fundraising
is low) would drop out of the race if the limit on individual contributions 	 is binding and
she lacks personal funds to support her campaign.
If the degree of political polarization is high in a society, and the two parties are located
on the two extremes of political spectrum, moderate candidates would emerge only if they
have sucient personal funds. If the degree of polarization is low, then extremist candidates
are also the wealthy ones. Campaign nance laws play a role to reinforce the existing
polarization, or the lack of it, in a society. For example, if self-nancing is restricted by
implementing a cap on how much candidates can contribute to their own campaigns, this
would reduce the wealthy candidates' freedom of policy choice. In a polarized society, this
would suggest moderate candidates that rely on personal funds would drop put of the race.
In a non-polarized society, this policy would reduce the emergence of extremist candidates
on both sides of the political spectrum.
Restricting the use of personal funds in political campaigns in the U.S. has been found
unconstitutional in 1976 (Buckley v. Valeo) on the grounds that it restricts the candidates'
freedom of speech.10 However, legislators designed a mechanism that reduces the incentives of
self-nancing indirectly. TheMillionaires' Amendment in the McCain-Feingold Law that was
passed in 2002 increases the cap on individual contributions for candidates whose opponent
is relying heavily on personal funds. The eect of this amendment on the emergence of
moderate/extremist candidates would be similar but less pronounced to that of a cap on
self-nancing. While a cap aects the ability of wealthy candidates to spend their own
money on campaigning, the amendment makes it more costly to support one's position
through self-nancing. Wealthy candidates may still run for oce, but they would have
to spend more to be competitive against their partisan opponents. This would change the
polarization of the society to a lesser extent, but cause an increase in the cost of winning an
election.
10See Corrado et al. (2005) for a detailed history of campaign nance regulations in the U.S..
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5 Conclusion
The existing theoretical literature focuses on analyzing the eects of lobby contributions
on policy choices of candidates, while ignoring other sources of campaign nance. In this
paper, I show the availability of individual contributions and self-nancing has non-trivial
eects on the equilibrium outcomes of an election game. The model I propose is suitable to
evaluate the impact of changes in campaign nance laws on the degree of political polarization
in a society.
This model can be made richer in a number of ways. First, I assumed that all sources
of contributions aect the probability of election in the same way, and that the productiv-
ity of each source is the same at all levels. However, one could argue there is decreasing
marginal productivity of each source, making diversication of contributions a better option
for candidates. Also, there might be complementarities across the sources of contributions,
rendering the composition of contributions important in addition to the total quantity of
funds available.
Second, candidate emergence can be explicitly modeled through introducing a primary
election for each party. Such a setup would also allow the introduction of party contributions
candidates receive. It is likely that parties view their contributions as complements to
other sources. Steen (2006) claims party spending responds to self-nancing dierently for
each party, and argues the Democratic Party is less likely than the Republican Party to
support self-nancers in the U.S. House elections. Modeling party contributions could help
us understand why this is the case.
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Appendix
Solving for Lobby Contributions
Let A and B the Lagrange multipliers to the non-negativity constraints on contribu-
tions. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions to problem (6) then are:
  @PA
@cL`;A
jxL`   Aj+
@PA
@cL`;A
jxL`   Bj   1 + A = 0 (11)
  @PA
@cL`;B
jxL`   Aj+
@PA
@cL`;B
jxL`   Bj   1 + B = 0 (12)
Ac
L
`;A = 0; A  0; cL`;A  0 (13)
Bc
L
`;B = 0; B  0; cL`;B  0 (14)
From (3), we derive the partial derivatives:
@PA
@cL`;A
= (1  ) CB
(CA + CB)2
(15)
@PA
@cL`;B
= (1  )  CA
(CA + CB)2
(16)
Substituting (15) and (16) into (11) and (12), we get:
 (1  ) CB
(CA + CB)2
(jxL`   Aj   jxL`   Bj)  1 + A = 0 (17)
 (1  )  CA
(CA + CB)2
(jxL`   Aj   jxL`   Bj)  1 + B = 0 (18)
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose lobby ` contributes to both campaign, i.e. cL`;A > 0 and
cL`;B > 0. According to Kuhn-Tucker conditions, A = B = 0 and (17) and (18) become:
 (1  ) CB
(CA + CB)2
(jxL`   Aj   jxL`   Bj) = 1 (19)
 (1  )  CA
(CA + CB)2
(jxL`   Aj   jxL`   Bj) = 1 (20)
which imply CA =  CB. Since CA  0 and CB  0, this implies CA = CB = 0, which would
be a contradiction to cL`;A > 0 and c
L
`;A > 0. Hence, a lobby would not contribute to both
campaigns at the same time.
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Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that a lobby ` contributes to A's campaign. This
suggests cL`;A > 0 and c
L
`;B = 0. Then A = 0 and B > 0 and:
 (1  ) CB
(CA + CB)2
(jxL`   Aj   jxL`   Bj) = 1 (21)
 (1  )  CA
(CA + CB)2
(jxL`   Aj   jxL`   Bj) < 1 (22)
Equation (21) implies jxL`   Aj   jxL`   Bj < 0, which means that the ideal policy of lobby
` is closer to A than B. Inequality (22) implies that if the two candidates are equally away
from a lobby's ideal position, so that jxL`  Aj jxL`  Bj = 0, neither receives contributions
from that lobby.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ` be a lobby contributing to candidate A's campaign.
Rearranging (19), we get:
CA =
p
CB(1  )
q
jxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj   CB (23)
Since total contributions can be decomposed as CA = c
L
`;A+
P
6`=` c
L
`;A+c
P
A+c
A
A, equation
(23) can be written as:
cL`;A =
p
CB(1  )
q
jxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj   CB  
X
` 6=`
cL`;A   cPA   cAA (24)
Adding contributions of all MA lobbies, we get:
X
`
cL`;A = c
L
A =
p
CB(1  )
MA
X
`
q
jxL`   Bj   jxL`   A)  CB   cPA   cAA (25)
Similarly for candidate B:
cLB =
p
CB(1  )
MB
X
`0
q
(jxL`0   Aj   jxL`0   Bj)  CA   cPB   cBB (26)
Equations (25) and (26) can then be rearranged to give:
CA =
p
CB(1  )
MA
X
`
q
jxL`   Bj   jxL`   A)  CB (27)
CB =
p
CA(1  )
MB
X
`0
q
jxL`0   Aj   jxL`0   Bj   CA (28)
19
These imply:p
CB(1  )
MA
X
`
q
jxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj =
p
CA(1  )
MB
X
`0
q
jxL`0   Aj   jxL`0   B
Rearranging gives:
CA
CB
=

MB
MA
P
`
pjxL`   Bj   jxL`   AjP
`0
pjxL`0   Aj   jxL`0   Bj
2
(29)
Inserting equation (29) in (27) gives:
MB
MA
P
`
pjxL`   Bj   jxL`   AjP
`0
pjxL`0   Aj   jxL`0   Bj
2
CB =
p
CB(1  )
MA
X
`
q
(jxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj) CB
(30)
Rearranging (30) gives equation (8). Similarly, inserting equation (29) in (28) gives equa-
tion (7).
Proof of Proposition 4. Any lobby, whose marginal benet is above its marginal cost of
contributing would contribute. Let ` be any lobby contributing to A's campaign. Then, it
must be that:
(1  ) CB
(CA + CB)2
(jxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj)  1 (31)
Plugging in the aggregate contribution supply functions (7) and (8) and with some patience,
condition (31) simplies to:
jxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj 
P
`
pjxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj
MA
2
(32)
If `'s ideal policy is more extreme than candidate A's, then the dierence becomes jxL`  
Bj   jxL`   Aj = B   A. This is the maximum value that dierence can get. Hence, for
all `0 such that A < xL`0 < B:
jxL`0   Bj   jxL`0   Aj < B   A (33)
Note that if one extremist lobby nds it worthwhile to contribute to A's campaign, then all
the other extremist lobbies also contribute. If there are initially MA extremist lobbies that
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contribute, a moderate lobby `0 would contribute if:
jxL`0   Bj   jxL`0   Aj 
P
`
pjxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj
MA + 1
2
(34)
which can be written as:q
jxL`0   Bj   jxL`0   Aj 
MA
p
B   A +
pjxL`0   Bj   jxL`0   Aj
MA + 1
(35)
Rearranging: q
jxL`0   Bj   jxL`0   Aj 
p
B   A (36)
which contradicts with (33). Hence, no moderate lobby contributes.
Proof of Proposition 5. Following Proposition (4):
X
`
q
jxL`   Bj   jxL`   Aj =MA
p
B   A (37)X
`0
q
jxL`0   Bj   jxL`0   Aj =MB
p
B   A (38)
Plugging (37) and (38) into (7) and (8) renders (9).
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